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An Essay on Miranda’s Fortieth Birthday 
By Paul Shechtman* 
Miranda v. Arizona1 has now reached its fortieth birthday, 
and it has grown in stature with age.  After Dickerson v. United 
States,2 Miranda is clearly a “constitutional decision.”  Forty 
years later, however, basic questions about Miranda’s effect re-
main hotly debated: Does Miranda frustrate effective law en-
forcement by shielding the guilty from custodial interrogations?  
Does it protect the innocent from false confessions and wrongful 
convictions?  Should its warnings be modified to better serve 
their intended purpose?  If not, what other measures should be 
considered if one believes, as I do, that police interrogation re-
quires additional regulation?  This essay, which grows out of my 
presentation at the Chapman Law Review Miranda symposium, 
addresses those questions. 
I. 
As others have observed, there is a paucity of useful empiri-
cal analysis of Miranda’s effect on police interrogation.3  In the 
immediate aftermath of the decision, there was a flurry of re-
search, but most scholars agree that the studies are flawed.4  
Principal among the shortcomings was a failure to appreciate 
that the police would adapt to Miranda with time.  As a result, 
the early studies do not provide a reliable basis for drawing long-
term conclusions. 
 
 * Paul Shechtman is a partner at Stillman, Friedman & Shechtman, P.C. and an 
Adjunct Professor at Columbia University Law School, where he teaches Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure. 
 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 3 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year 
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 
1058 (1998) (“In what has aptly been described as an ‘empirical desert,’ we have little 
knowledge about what police interrogation looked like shortly after Miranda, much less 
what it looks like today.” (citing H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW 
PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 198 (1988))); 
George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) 
Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996). 
 4 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631–52 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Sub-
stantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 506–41 
(1996). 
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Since those early years, there have been only two studies of 
note, both published in 1996: one by Professor Leo conducted in 
the Bay Area5 and the other by Professor (now Judge) Cassell 
and his student, Bret Hayman, conducted in Salt Lake County.6  
Those studies are notable because in each, approximately 80% of 
arrestees who received Miranda warnings elected to waive their 
rights and face questioning.7  And in each, less than 5% of those 
who initially waived later reconsidered and invoked.8  Two stud-
ies is a small sample from which to generalize, but it is all we 
have; hence, those numbers—80% waive, and few subsequently 
invoke—are treated as revealed truths in the Miranda literature. 
If those numbers are accurate, the first obvious question is, 
why do so many arrestees agree to talk?  The principal reason, no 
doubt, is that arrestees want to talk: the innocent want to ex-
plain their innocence, and the guilty want to minimize their cul-
pability.  (Often, an arrestee does not appreciate the extent to 
which he has incriminated himself, as when he admits to a rob-
bery but denies pulling the trigger, only to be charged with felony 
murder.)  Many arrestees are loath to remain silent lest the po-
lice draw an adverse inference against them.  Some waive their 
rights in order to learn what the police know about the crime.  
They recognize that the police are unlikely to talk to them unless 
they talk to the police.9 
Another reason that so relatively few arrestees invoke is that 
the Miranda warnings are ineffectual.  In part that is because 
the police have learned to give the warnings in a way that masks 
their import.  They have learned to “waltz around Miranda,” to 
use the words of a detective whom Professor Leo interviewed.10  A 
revealing example is the recent decision in Hairston v. United 
States,11 in which the defendant, an 18-year-old, was arrested for 
a gang-related murder.  The arrest occurred at approximately 
10:00 p.m., and the lead detective gave the arresting officer ex-
press instructions not to administer Miranda warnings.  Instead, 
the defendant was placed in an interview room and left there 
alone for more than an hour.  When the lead detective finally en-
 
 5 Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 
(1996). 
 6 Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996). 
 7 Leo, supra note 5, at 276; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 859–60. 
 8 Leo, supra note 5, at 275; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 860. 
 9 For insight into the diverse factors that motivate arrestees to talk, see Anemona 
Hartocollis, Remain Silent? Some in Custody Spell it All Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007. 
 10 Leo, supra note 4, at 665; see also Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to 
Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by 
Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 431–47 (1999). 
 11 Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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tered the room, he launched into a lengthy speech.  He an-
nounced that he knew the defendant was involved in the crime, 
named others who supposedly also participated, and informed 
the defendant that another gang member had already confessed.  
All the while, the detective admonished the defendant to “listen 
and not talk.”12 
When the defendant first spoke, it was to express his disbe-
lief that his fellow gang member was cooperating.  The detective 
countered by showing the defendant a videotape of the other 
gang member talking to the police.  The videotape was played for 
one minute with the volume off so that the defendant could only 
guess at what his confederate was saying.  It was at that point, 
almost an hour into the session, that the detective asked the de-
fendant if he wanted to tell “his side of the story.”  When the de-
fendant answered “yes,” the detective administered the Miranda 
warnings.  Three hours later, he had elicited a confession to the 
crime.13  That the detective’s stratagem was found to comport 
with Miranda, which it was, speaks volumes about our willing-
ness to tolerate “waltzing.” 
The answer to the second obvious question—why do so few 
arrestees who initially waive subsequently invoke?—can be found 
in a brilliant article by Professor Stuntz, who calls such persons 
“conditional talkers.”14  As Professor Stuntz observes, conditional 
talkers are optimistic that they can talk their way out of trouble, 
seemingly ignorant of the fact that talking to the police is a peril-
ous course, fearful of angering the police by initially invoking, 
courageous enough to say “stop” in mid-stream, and sophisticated 
enough to realize that if they say “stop,” the police will presuma-
bly accede to their request.  That so few people share that mix of 
traits—in Professor Stuntz’s words, “ignorant and knowledge-
able, fearful and courageous, irrationally optimistic and unusu-
ally sophisticated”—should not be surprising.15 
One other fact helps explain why there are so few conditional 
talkers.  Increased police professionalism, to which Miranda has 
contributed, has meant that interrogation tactics are less abu-
sive, so that the need to say “stop” is less pressing.  A little-noted 
aspect of the Leo and Cassell-Hayman studies is the brevity of 
the observed interrogations: 92% of the interrogations Leo ob-
served lasted two hours or less and all but one of the interroga-
tions that Cassell and Hayman studied lasted one hour or less.16  
 
 12 Id. at 770–71. 
 13 Id. at 772. 
 14 William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 983 (2001). 
 15 Id. at 986–87. 
 16 Leo, supra note 5, at 279; Cassell & Hayman, supra note 6, at 892. 
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An arrestee is less likely to invoke mid-stream when the stream 
is so short. 
II. 
The goal of confession law should be to regulate the interro-
gation process so as to maximize the number of arrestees who 
talk and to minimize abusive interrogations.  To borrow Justice 
Harlan’s words, “[P]eaceful interrogation is not one of the dark 
moments of the law.”17  Indeed, if the available data is correct, 
more than 50% of all interrogations yield incriminating evi-
dence.18  For me, what drove the point home was an assignment 
as a consultant to the District Attorney’s Office in pre-Katrina 
New Orleans, where the police had all but stopped questioning 
arrestees, even in homicide cases.  The result was homicide 
prosecutions that relied exclusively on the testimony of eyewit-
nesses and accomplices.  Not surprisingly, intimidation of wit-
nesses was rampant, and acquittals were common.  One can de-
bate whether confessions are good for the soul, but they are 
plainly good for the prosecution. 
How does Miranda fare when judged against the goal of 
maximizing non-abusive interrogations?  I will focus here on 
Miranda’s costs.  One cost is that some guilty defendants who 
might otherwise talk invoke their right to silence.  Estimating 
their number is a parlous task.  If 20% of arrestees invoke their 
Miranda rights and 50% of interrogations are successful, in-
criminating statements would be lost in 10% of cases.  That 
number, however, is high because some of those who invoke 
would remain silent even if Miranda were overruled.  (Among 
those who invoke are a disproportionate number of recidivists 
who apparently have learned that silence is golden.)19  Professor 
Schulhofer may well be close to the mark when he estimates that 
Miranda prevents the police from obtaining incriminating state-
ments in approximately 5% of cases.20  That is a small percent-
age, but it is a significant number in the aggregate (there were 
603,503 arrests in 2005 for violent crimes21), so that Miranda’s 
cost in lost evidence should not be lightly dismissed. 
 
 17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 18 Leo, supra note 5, at 280–81 (noting that older studies had success rates of ap-
proximately 50%, and suggesting success in as high as two-thirds of interrogations); see 
generally George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 
“Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933 (1996). 
 19 Leo, supra note 5, at 286–87. 
 20 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 545–46. 
 21 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE U.S. 2005 
tbl.29 (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html (classifying murder, forci-
ble rape, robbery, and aggravated assault as violent crimes). 
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Miranda imposes other costs on the criminal justice system 
as well.  We lose some voluntary confessions because of technical 
non-compliance with Miranda, but the number seems small.22  
What bears emphasis is that any exclusion of reliable evidence on 
a perceived “technicality” breeds disrespect for the law.  Take, for 
example, the recent case of United States v. Street, in which the 
defendant was a police officer with twenty-two years on the job 
who moonlighted as a bank robber.23  His voluntary confession 
was suppressed because he was given only two of the four warn-
ings.24  Bright line rules must be enforced, but no one should be 
pleased with the result in Street, which flouts common sense. 
Another cost of Miranda is a proliferation of hearings.  Even 
if the prosecution “wins,” the criminal justice system loses when 
scarce resources are devoted to pre-trial proceedings.  The sad 
reality is that the adjudicative process has become so costly that 
we plea bargain virtually all criminal cases.25  Trials have all but 
vanished.  Miranda contributes to that reality, which its admir-
ers too often forget. 
Miranda’s greatest cost, however, may be that it has stifled 
further effort to regulate police interrogation.  Miranda warn-
ings, it seems, share a common feature with the warnings on the 
boxes of commercial products.  Just as those warnings have 
shielded manufacturers from liability, Miranda warnings have 
shielded police interrogations from closer scrutiny.  If the warn-
ings are given, courts are less likely to look “inside the box” to see 
whether the police have employed dubious tactics.  As the Su-
preme Court itself has observed, “The requirement that Miranda 
warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the volun-
tariness inquiry.  But as we said in Berkemer v. McCarty, ‘[c]ases 
in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-
incriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that 
the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of 
Miranda are rare.’”26 
What we know is that Miranda has not eliminated false con-
fessions.  Professors Drizin and Leo have documented 125 proven 
 
 22 See George C. Thomas III, Stories about Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1976 
(2004) (describing studies which show that “police have adjusted to the rule that they 
must warn suspects before beginning custodial interrogation”). 
 23 United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 24 Id. at 1304, 1312–14. 
 25 Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137 (2005) (“[P]lea bargains resolve ninety-five percent of adjudicated cases.”); see 
also the classic article by John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3 (1978). 
 26 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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cases of false confessions since Miranda was announced.27  DNA 
exonerations have given prominence to the issue.  If we believe 
125 false confessions is an unacceptable number, as we must, 
then reforms that go beyond Miranda are required. 
III. 
Three reforms commend themselves. 
1. Videotaping.  A fundamental flaw of Miranda is that it 
does nothing to eliminate the swearing contest between the po-
lice and the arrestee that plagued courts in the pre-Miranda 
years.  It is still commonplace for a judge (or jury) to be faced 
with strikingly different accounts of what occurred behind closed 
doors.  In recent years, numerous jurisdictions have mandated 
videotaping to varying extents,28 and efforts should be made to 
study the effect.  Does videotaping reduce the number of custo-
dial interrogations?  Do the police circumvent the rules by con-
ducting more pre-custody interviews?  Does videotaping spawn 
litigation about what happened before the camera was turned 
on?  One recent study reports promising results.29  Surely any re-
form that both Professor Leo and Judge Cassell support (given 
their otherwise divergent views) deserves our careful considera-
tion. 
2. Expert testimony.  Juries, we now know, are not skilled at 
recognizing false confessions.  In the 35 false confession cases in 
the Drizin-Leo study that went to trial before a jury, the jury ac-
quitted in 7 and convicted in 28.30  That percentage reflects the 
fact that most jurors believe that an innocent person would not 
confess to a crime.  Expert testimony can help dispel that canard.  
The leading case is United States v. Hall,31 in which the court 
 
 27 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004). 
 28 See Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safe-
guards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 528–29 (identifying jurisdic-
tions that have required electronic recording); Cathy Young, Miranda Morass, REASON, 
Apr. 2000, at 54, 56 (“[A]t least 2,400 police and sheriffs’ departments nationwide (about 
15 percent of the total) audiotape or videotape . . . interrogations . . . .”). 
 29 See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NORTHWESTERN SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 6, 24–
26 (2004), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/documents/ 
SullivanReport.pdf. 
 30 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 953.  Fourteen of 125 false confessors pleaded 
guilty and two were convicted by a judge; the other seventy-four were never charged or 
the charges were dropped pre-trial. 
 31 United States v. Hall (Hall I), 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (remanding for a 
Daubert hearing); United States v. Hall (Hall II), 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (ad-
mitting expert testimony on remand); United States v. Hall (Hall III), 165 F.3d 1095 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (affirming convictions); see generally Nadia Soree, Comment, When the Inno-
cent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testi-
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found that such testimony would be helpful to the jury and that 
it passed muster under Daubert.  (The expert was allowed to tes-
tify that there are false confessions and to the factors that seem 
to produce them, but not that the defendant’s confession was 
false.)32  It bears note that Hall was convicted despite the expert’s 
testimony—an outcome which should allay the fears of some 
prosecutors that expert testimony about false confession is a rec-
ipe for false acquittals. 
3. Length Restrictions.  One of the lessons from Miranda lit-
erature is that protracted interrogations can yield false confes-
sions.  In 84% of the cases in the Drizin-Leo study for which the 
length of interrogation could be determined, questioning lasted 
more than six hours.  Several interrogations lasted more than a 
day.33  A rule limiting questioning to four hours with the ability 
to seek additional time from a judge in exceptional circumstances 
would seem desirable.34  I would not require the police to advise 
arrestees of the four-hour rule: what matters is not that arrestees 
know the limit but that there be one.35 
IV. 
There have been proposals to strengthen the Miranda warn-
ings to address the false confession problem.  One proposal calls 
for adding the admonition that a suspect’s silence cannot be used 
against him.36  For me, the proposal misses the mark.  An added 
warning might have the unwanted effect of increasing the num-
ber of arrestees who invoke.  And it is unlikely to prevent false 
confessions from occurring.  As noted above, false confessions are 
often the product of lengthy interrogations, and those who con-
fess falsely are often young or mentally defective.37  A refined 
warning would do precious little to prevent them from talking. 
Miranda is now forty years old, and, after Dickerson, its fifti-
 
mony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191 (2005). 
 32 Hall II, 974 F. Supp. at 1205. 
 33 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 948–49. 
 34 Notably, a leading manual on police interrogation indicates that four hours is gen-
erally sufficient to obtain a confession.  Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Consti-
tutional Safeguards against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 
145 (1997) (citing FRED E. INBAU, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 310 
(3d ed. 1986)). 
 35 Compare id. at 144 (arguing that “interrogators should be required at the outset to 
inform a suspect as to the maximum permissible length of the questioning”). 
 36 Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary 
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 813 (2006). 
 37 Drizin & Leo, supra note 27, at 948–49; Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Ju-
veniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 
308 (2006) (“By contrast, prolonged interrogation—especially in conjunction with youth-
fulness, mental retardation, or other psychological vulnerabilities—is strongly associated 
with eliciting false confessions.”). 
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eth birthday (and well beyond) seems assured.  It is now a fixture 
on the criminal justice landscape.  That said, we should not look 
to Miranda as a solution to the false confession problem.  Video-
taping, expert testimony, and length restrictions should be pro-
moted in upcoming years.  Their effect should be examined at the 
next Chapman Miranda symposium, say in 2017. 
